

Appendix A: Details About the Study

Links to the briefing materials and the pre- and post- deliberation survey instruments.

1. Briefing Materials:
https://github.com/soodoku/kirkuk/tree/master/data/briefing_materials
2. Survey Instrument:
<https://github.com/soodoku/kirkuk/tree/master/data/questionnaires>

Item Text

Socio-Demographics and Ethnic/National Identification

1. What was your age on your last birthday?
2. What is your gender? Male, Female
3. Where were you born?
4. How long have you lived in Kirkuk? All my life (1), Less than 1 year (2), Less than 5 years, Less than 10 years
5. Which religion or religious sect do you regard yourself belonging to? Sunni, Shi'a, Catholic, Other, I do not consider myself belonging to any religion
6. What is your ethnic background? Kurd, Arab, Turkman, Other
7. Generally speaking, do you usually think of yourself as? Iraqi first and foremost, Kurdish first and then Iraqi, Arab first and then Iraqi, Turkoman first and then Iraqi, Kurdish only, Turkoman only, Arab only, Other

Inter-Group Contact

How often do you have contact with members of other ethnic groups? Never (1), Seldom (2), Regularly (3), Often (4), Very often (5)

Beliefs About and Attitudes Toward the 3 major Ethnic Groups

- On a scale of 0 to 10 scale, where 0 is ‘untrustworthy’, 10 is ‘trustworthy’, and 5 is exactly in-between, where would you place Kurds, Turkomen, and Arabs.
- On a scale of 0 to 10, where 0 is ‘not open to reason’ and 10 is ‘open to reason’ and 5 is exactly in-between, where would you place Kurds, Turkomen, and Arabs
- In general, how positive or negative are you with regard to members of other ethnic groups? On a scale of 0 to 10, where 0 is ‘negative’, 10 is ‘positive’ and 5 is exactly in between, where would you place Kurds, Turkomen, and Arabs

Political Knowledge

Correct answers are in **bold**.

1. According to the UN, the estimated the total population of Kirkuk is in excess of...?
1,300,000, 1,100,000, **900,000**, 700,000, Don't know
2. The Kirkuk oil field contains what percentage of Iraq's proven oil reserves? 50%, 40%, 30%, **20%**, Don't know
3. Funding for public servants and city reconstruction comes from? The Federal Government, KRG, **The federal government and the KRG jointly**, Neither the Federal Government nor the KRG, Don't know
4. Article 140 of the 2005 Iraqi constitution provides for? Kirkuk joining the Kurdistan region, **A referendum on the constitutional status of Kirkuk**, Kirkuk becoming a federal region in its own right, Don't know.

5. With regard to the powers shared between the Federal Government and the Provincial Council, which institution currently has priority in cases of dispute? The Federal Government, **The Provincial Council**, Neither has priority, Don't know

Trust in Institutions and Leaders

Can you, on a scale from 0 to 10, indicate how much trust you personally have in each of the following institutions? 0 means that you have no trust at all in this institution and 10 means you have complete trust in it. ----- The Governor of Kirkuk, The Deputy Governor of Kirkuk, The Provincial Council, The Federal Government, The Kurdistan Regional Government, The Council of Representatives, The judiciary, The police, The army, Politicians, Political parties, The Independent High Electoral Commission, The media, UNAMI (United Nations Iraq).

Political Efficacy

How interested would you say you are in politics? Not at all interested, Hardly interested, Quite interested, Very interested, Don't know

And how confident are you in your own ability to participate in politics? Not at all (0), Extremely so (10), Don't know.

Respondents were then presented a series of statements:

1. I feel confident about my own ability to participate in politics.
2. I consider myself to be well qualified to participate in politics.
3. I feel that I have a pretty good understanding of the important issues facing Kirkuk.
4. I think I am better informed about politics and government than most people.
5. Sometimes politics and government seem so complicated that a person like me can't really understand what's going on.
6. People like me don't have any say about what government does.

7. Public officials do not care much about what people like me think.

Appendix B: English Translation of the Briefing Materials

Kirkuk is an oil-rich city. It is also known throughout the region for its distinctive ethnic, linguistic, religious and cultural diversity. The city's ethnic and religious groups lived peacefully together for centuries. Today, however, control of Kirkuk is hotly contested by its ethnic groups on one hand, and the federal government in Baghdad and the Kurdistan regional government (KRG) on the other. In particular, *the question of how the city should be governed* has remained unsettled. This dispute is a threat to peace in Kirkuk and to stability in the country as a whole.

The purpose of this deliberative forum is to give you the opportunity to discuss the options for governing Kirkuk in a safe and constructive environment. We want to know what you think and we hope this information booklet will help guide your deliberations. At the end of your deliberations, we would kindly ask you to fill out the same questionnaire that you took on initial contact.

The Situation in Kirkuk

The situation in Kirkuk is complex, so let us start with some factual information.

Demographics

Discussing population statistics for Kirkuk is a sensitive affair, particularly in the absence of comprehensive census data. Nevertheless, in 2011 the UN estimated the total population of Kirkuk to be in excess of 900,000 people.¹

Estimating the size of each ethnic group is particularly tricky. However, electoral results do give us some indication. Three provincial elections (2005, 2009 and 2013) have been conducted in Iraq, though Kirkuk only participated in the 2005 elections. In that election, the Kurds won 26

¹ Inter-agency Information and Analysis Unit: Kirkuk Governorate Profile.
<http://www.kurdipedia.org/documents/87932/0001.PDF>.

out of 41 seats (about 63% of the seats), Turkomans won 9 (about 22%), and Arabs won 6 (about 15%) (though the low turnout of Sunni Arabs should be noted).

Provincial elections results in Kirkuk, January 2005

Parties	Votes	Seats
List of Kurdistan Brotherhood	237,303	26
Iraqi Turkoman Front	73,791	8
Iraqi Republican Group (Sunni Arab)	43,635	5
The Islamic Turkoman Coalition	12,678	1
National Iraq Union (Sunni Arab)	12,329	1

Economics

In theory, Kirkuk is one of the richest cities of the world. The Kirkuk oil field is the second-largest oilfield in the country, containing 20% of Iraq's proven oil reserves. The Kirkuk field's production is predicted to peak at just over 500,000 barrels per day around 2025 before trailing off to fewer than 200,000 barrels per day in 2050. However, in spite of the presence of large amounts of oil, Kirkuk governorate has experienced little economic benefit from its presence.

Financially, Kirkuk has institutional linkages to both Baghdad and the KRG and depends on both of them to pay its public servants and to reconstruct the city. Since 2006, Baghdad has used the Accelerated Reconstruction and Development (ARD) mechanism to transfer block grants from the federal budget to the provinces. The aim has been to facilitate short-term projects in parallel with the longer-term budget initiatives carried out by the ministries. The KRG, on the other hand, has been involved in the province and provides financial support to develop various projects. For example, according to one report, of a total of about 1,390 schools across Kirkuk province, 460 of them were funded by KRG in which their curriculums and teaching are entirely Kurdish. This means that both Baghdad and KRG rather than Kirkuk Provincial Council (KPC) are more influential when it comes to appointing public employees. Due to both falling oil prices and rising

Iraqi military expenditure because of fighting against ISIS, Kirkuk has faced a financial crisis. The ARDP fund has been suspended by the federal government since August 2014. Nevertheless, to meet its financial needs, the KPC currently depends on both Baghdad and the KRG.

The legal situation

The population of Kirkuk has shifted considerably as a result of the policies of various Iraqi regimes, which has in turn led to tensions between Kirkuk's ethnic groups. Article 58 of the 2004 Transitional Administrative Law (TAL) was intended to deal with this tension and 'normalize' the situation. The law outlines a number of steps including the return of displaced people, the recovery of their properties and homes, and the reversal of border alterations.

In 2005, the new Iraqi Constitution was adopted and ratified. Article 140 replaced the TAL's Article 58 and includes provision for a census and a referendum on the constitutional status of Kirkuk. Both the wording and the timing of the referendum remain under negotiation. Potentially, however, it may result in one of three options, as we will now outline.

THE OPTIONS

There are three major options for governing Kirkuk which are constitutionally plausible:

- (1) A governorate under the authority of the federal government
- (2) Becoming an autonomous region
- (3) Joining the Kurdistan region.

Option 1: A governorate under the authority of the federal government

Under this option, the existing arrangements for governing Kirkuk would be maintained (the status quo option). That is, the governorate would ultimately remain under the control of Baghdad. However, the Provincial Council of Kirkuk would maintain certain powers, including the power to develop policies and pass laws, to approve local security plans, to select the symbols

for the governorate, and to collect taxes, duties and fees. Moreover, with regard to the powers shared between the Federal Government and the Provincial Council, priority would continue to be given to laws made by the Council in case of dispute.

Advantages	Disadvantages
No new government institutions would need to be created and agreed.	Kirkuk would remain under the control of the Federal Government.
Kirkuk would still be entitled to an equitable share of national revenues.	Kirkuk will not have full control over the levy of taxes or over monetary and fiscal policy more generally.

Option 2: Becoming an autonomous region

Under this option, Kirkuk would enjoy more executive and legislative powers than as a governorate. As an autonomous region, it would enjoy the rights of a federal region rather than mere decentralization. The 2005 constitution lists the competencies that the federal and regional authorities are to share together. These include: managing customs, electric energy sources and distribution, environment, general development and planning, public health, education and internal water resources (Article 114, constitution of Iraq). Priority is given to the regional law over federal law in case of any dispute.

Advantages	Disadvantages
It would allow Kirkuk to exercise greater control over its own internal affairs.	New institutions would be required that might be difficult to design and to agree.
It would reduce the desire for secession.	It might cause a domino effect in regard to other governorates.

Option 3: Joining the Kurdistan region

Under this option, Kirkuk would remain a governorate, but would become part of the Kurdish federal region. As a governorate under Erbil, the Provincial Council of Kirkuk would have roughly the same powers as it does today under Bagdad. Ultimately, however, it would be answerable to Erbil (just as, today, it is ultimately answerable to Bagdad).

Advantages	Disadvantages
No new government institutions would need to be created and agreed.	It would change the balance between the centre and the periphery
It would redress the historical grievances of the Kurds.	Arabs and Turkomans would become minorities inside the Kurdistan Region.

Appendix C: Attitude Change on Other Items

The survey instrument included other questions beyond the ones discussed in the main text of the manuscript. But we excluded some item from main text because we wanted to focus on a few big questions. Here we present results from the remaining items along with a discussion of the results.

The remaining items fall into the following broad categories: 1) Attitudes towards own and other groups, 2) Evaluation of the Government, 3) Priorities for the Government, and 4) political efficacy and own and society's deliberative capacity. For item text of all the questions, see Appendix A.

Of the items measuring attitudes toward own and other groups, we built a measure of ethnocentrism. Ethnocentric bias means that you think your ethnic group is better than other ethnic groups (Levine and Campbell 1972). We measured the concept by asking participants (1) how open to reason and (2) how trustworthy they thought various groups were, and (3) how positively they felt about each group, on a 0 to 10 scale. We calculated ethnocentrism as the difference between participant's ratings of their group and their average rating of other groups. We use self-reported ethnicity to condition the responses. For instance, for Arabs, we averaged the ratings they gave to Arabs on the three questions and subtracted the average ratings they gave to Kurds and Turkmen on the same questions. We then rescaled the measure to lie between 0 and 1, where 0 means the participant gave the top rating on trust, openness to reason and feelings toward the group to their own group and the bottom rating to the other two groups, and 1 means the opposite: top ratings to other groups and bottom ratings to own group.

Results

Ethnocentrism

On average, before deliberation (pooled T1), participants thought that Arabs, Kurds, and Turkmen were somewhat open to reason, thought they were trustworthy, and felt positively toward them—all the means are above .5 on a 0 to 1 scale, where 0 means the person thinks the group is not open to reason, is untrustworthy, and the person feels negatively about the group, and 1 means the person thinks that the group is open to reason, trustworthy, and the person feels positively about the group. As we stated above, we condensed these attitudes and beliefs into an index that tapped into an ethnocentrism measure that tracks how much “better” a person thinks their own group is, and how much more positively a person feels toward their group than toward other groups. At T1, the mean difference between own group and other groups was a hefty .306 on a 0 to 1 scale.

Our expectation was that the opportunity to deliberate under “good” conditions would reduce ethnocentrism. Surprisingly, there is little evidence of that. D alone does very little to alter participants’ beliefs about the various groups and how they feel about them versus their own group. DI, on the other hand, leads to a sharp *rise* in ethnocentrism, from .297 in the pre-deliberation wave to .445 in the post-deliberation wave ($p = .025$).

Evaluation of Government, Equitable Government, and Governing Capacity

The broad pattern you see in the three sets of variables is of modest to little change, changes we cannot distinguish from noise. D and DI both fail to persuade people that the government is any more equitable, or that it is efficient or has greater capacity than before.

Table C1: Miscellaneous Items

Items	Pooled	D				DI			
	T1	T1	T2	Diff.	<i>p</i>	T1	T2	Diff.	<i>p</i>
<i>Attitudes Toward Ethnic Groups</i>									
Regard for Arabs' views	.68	.78	.68	-.11	.02	.57	.63	.07	.13
Regard for Kurds' views	.74	.75	.63	-.11	.03	.67	.64	-.03	.54
Regard for Turkomans' views	.65	.72	.59	-.13	.01	.60	.66	.07	.06
Trust in Arabs' views	.55	.67	.64	-.04	.33	.49	.55	.05	.20
Trust in Kurds' views	.61	.62	.55	-.07	.02	.54	.54	.00	.96
Trust in Turkomans' views	.54	.59	.53	-.06	.07	.56	.64	.08	.01
Arabs' openness to reason	.55	.63	.63	.00	.95	.58	.57	-.01	.89
Kurds' openness to reason	.62	.59	.59	.00	1.00	.55	.52	-.03	.52
Turkomans' openness to reason	.53	.59	.53	-.06	.08	.56	.66	.10	.02
<i>Ethnocentrism</i>	.31	.22	.27	.05	.44	.30	.45	.15	.03
<i>Evaluation of Government</i>									
Kirkuk best governed governorate	.42	.39	.35	-.03	.38	.43	.49	.05	.35
Provincial council operates efficiently	.06	.05	.05	.00	.88	.06	.06	.00	.73
Provincial council uses money wisely	.16	.15	.15	.00	.86	.15	.21	.06	.07
<i>Equitable Government</i>									
Governor works for good of all society	.47	.44	.41	-.03	.36	.42	.40	-.02	.74
Deputy Governor works for good of all	.46	.44	.39	-.05	.11	.41	.41	.01	.89
Provincial council accountable to all	.57	.46	.50	.04	.52	.62	.57	-.05	.38
<i>Governing Capacity</i>									
Provincial council well financed	.45	.44	.45	.01	.88	.45	.48	.03	.61
Provincial council sufficient powers	.50	.52	.53	.02	.73	.43	.41	-.01	.79

Provincial council and Fed. Govt. cooperate .27 .30 .34 .04 .30 .24 .31 .07 .21

Note: ^a Responses were reverse coded so that larger numbers reflect greater efficacy; All the p-values are two-tailed.

Political Efficacy, Own and Society's Deliberative Capacity

Deliberating under good conditions or being provided with balanced information and Many of the differences in D have the wrong sign—post-deliberation assessments are potentially a shade lower but generally small and we cannot discount the possibility that these differences were due to chance alone.

Table 5: Political Efficacy and Own and Society's Deliberative Capacity

Items	Pooled	D				DI			
	T1	T1	T2	Diff.	<i>p</i>	T1	T2	Diff.	<i>p</i>
<i>Political Efficacy</i>									
Confidence in own ability	.45	.49	.46	-.03	.41	.34	.34	.01	.85
Own qualifications	.43	.49	.52	.04	.47	.31	.33	.02	.74
Own understanding	.66	.63	.59	-.04	.35	.56	.52	-.05	.50
More informed than most	.49	.53	.49	-.04	.40	.32	.34	.02	.77
Politics too complicated*	.58	.51	.50	-.01	.81	.69	.68	-.01	.81
No real say*	.55	.50	.56	.05	.34	.43	.49	.06	.47
Public officials indifferent*	.72	.72	.62	-.09	.16	.72	.74	.02	.81
<i>Political Efficacy Index</i>	.57	.54	.51	-.03	.17	.34	.34	.01	.85
<i>Own Deliberative Capacity</i>									
Interest in political discussion	.37	.40	.44	.04	.37	.31	.36	.05	.20
Comfort voicing own views	.51	.49	.61	.12	.02	.50	.56	.06	.27
Interest in hearing others' views	.54	.52	.53	.01	.89	.55	.54	-.01	.78
Willingness to listen to conflicting views	.51	.46	.51	.05	.27	.58	.57	-.01	.81
Openness to revising own political views	.49	.51	.51	.00	1.00	.52	.53	.01	.83

<i>Own Deliberative Capacity Index</i>	.50	.48	.54	.06	.02	.53	.56	.02	.37
<i>Society's Deliberative Capacity</i>									
General interest in political discussion	.45	.40	.42	.03	.44	.46	.38	-.07	.04
Comfort voicing views	.53	.51	.52	.01	.88	.57	.54	-.03	.54
Interest in hearing others' views	.41	.43	.51	.08	.15	.41	.38	-.03	.61
Willingness to listen to conflicting views	.36	.38	.48	.10	.03	.29	.35	.06	.18
Openness to revising political views	.40	.44	.47	.03	.39	.36	.39	.02	.69
<i>Society's Deliberative Capacity Index</i>	.44	.43	.48	.04	.14	.44	.42	-.02	.42

Note: * Responses were reverse coded so that larger numbers reflect greater efficacy; All the p-values are two-tailed.

The changes in DI are, if anything, yet smaller. On average, DI does not seem to have made any difference on how politically efficacious people feel ($DI_{t2} - DI_{t1} = .01, p = .85$). This is somewhat surprising given that a) participants in DI gained knowledge, and b) participants in DI start out with much lower political efficacy scores than D ($DI_{t1} = .34; D_{t1} = .54; p < .05$) and hence have more room to grow.

Moving to self-assessments of capacity to deliberate, D causes participants to think that they have a greater capacity to deliberate ($D_{t2} - D_{t1} = .06, p = .02$; see Table 5). The changes across the index items are all the same sign but generally small (less than .05) with only one item—assessments of comfort in voicing opinion—changing a lot ($D_{t2} - D_{t1} = .12, p = .02$). Moving to DI, we see no corresponding change in people's assessments of their own capacity to deliberate ($DI_{t2} - DI_{t1} = .02, p = .37$).

Corresponding with small, positive change in self-assessments of own capacity to deliberate in D, assessments of other people's capacity to deliberate potentially show a small upward movement in D ($D_{t2} - D_{t1} = .04, p = .14$). All the changes in the constituent items of the index have the same sign, but the changes are generally small and imprecisely estimated. Only one item—

assessments of people's willingness to listen to conflicting views—shows a statistically significant increase ($D_{t2} - D_{t1} = .10, p = .03$).

And once again, DI does not seem to change people's assessments of others' capacity to deliberate ($D_{t2} - D_{t1} = -.02, p = .42$).

Overall, it appears that D had a small positive effect. After participating in D, people felt more comfortable voicing their own opinion, and felt that others were more willing to listen to conflicting views. However, DI doesn't seem to have made much of a difference to political efficacy or to own or society's capacity to deliberate.